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Abstract:
Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the recent release of the Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper affirm the Government’s commitment
toward carbon emissions reduction and the advancement of the environmental cause.
Using a naïve model which maximises the environmental cause at the expense of
financial impact on the economy, this paper highlights how the failure of the first
phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the
over-relaxation of parameters crucial to the success of the scheme as measured by
verified reduction in emissions. The Government’s preferred position as elucidated in
the Green Paper is then contrasted in this context to illustrate the possible sources of
failure that are currently engendered in the Scheme. The implementation of the
Scheme will impose great compliance costs on the economy – we argue that the
Government’s over zealous protection of business interests may ultimately lead to
failure of the Scheme, in which case the businesses and community would have
incurred the financial burden over nothing.
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Abstract:
Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the recent release of the Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper affirm the Government’s commitment
toward carbon emissions reduction and the advancement of the environmental cause.
Using a naïve model which maximises the environmental cause at the expense of
financial impact on the economy, this paper highlights how the failure of the first
phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the
over-relaxation of parameters crucial to the success of the scheme as measured by
verified reduction in emissions. The Government’s preferred position as elucidated in
the Green Paper is then contrasted in this context to illustrate the possible sources of
failure that are currently engendered in the Scheme. The implementation of the
Scheme will impose great compliance costs on the economy – we argue that the
Government’s over zealous protection of business interests may ultimately lead to
failure of the Scheme, in which case the businesses and community would have
incurred the financial burden over nothing.
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1. Introduction
As more scientific research produce evidence that reinforce the negative impact
greenhouse gasses have on climate change, the knee-jerk solution is to reduce the total
emission of these gasses globally. These gasses are collectively termed as “carbonequivalent” or just “carbon” for simplicity in definition and measurement. The Kyoto
Protocol is tasked with the objective of reducing global carbon emissions and sets
short and long term reduction trajectories accordingly. Each country signatory is then
mandated to reduce its emissions in line with these trajectories.

Australia’s recent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent release of the
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) Green Paper signal the Rudd
Government’s firm commitment toward carbon pollution control and environmental
protection. In developing the Green Paper, the Government relies on several key
sources for information and feedback, including the Garnaut Climate Change Review
(commissioned by the Government), the National Emissions Trading Taskforce, the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) and other schemes that are
already in operation in certain Australian states and territories as well as elsewhere in
the world.

The implications of this significant step are immense for Australian businesses,
particularly pollution emitters, and while the economy as a whole is expected to be
affected, the precise potential financial impact is an unknown factor which is unable
to be reliably measured. Achieving the environmental aim and minimising the
economic impact at the same instance are two rather separate objectives made even
more difficult by their inherent inverse relationship with each other. Needless to say,

4

it is imperative that the Australian CPRS works to not only reduce carbon pollution
over time, but to do so at minimum costs. For these concerns to be met, the CPRS has
to be well designed with policies well implemented in order to provide as much
regulatory and financial certainty to businesses and other participants.

Using design assessment criteria specifically stated by the Government, this paper
highlights several key weaknesses in the Scheme which can potentially contribute to
its failure. We introduce a naïve model which maximises the environmental objective
as well as the experience from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as our
basis of argument. Our paper is particularly motivated by the failure of reducing
overall emissions in Europe despite the presence of a scheme since 2005.
Additionally, this study contributes to the understanding of policy factors which
influence the outcomes of the scheme, and is therefore helpful to the Australian
Government which has stated previously that “the Government’s overriding objective
is to get the design right” (Green Paper Summary, pg.10). The subject matter of this
study has been received by the Government in the form of a submission and is
published online. 1

This paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the generic ‘cap-ntrade’ currently used in carbon reduction schemes. Section 3 introduces the naïve
model which is a cap-n-trade scheme that maximises the environmental cause at the
expense of economic impact, while section 4 illustrates how the failure of the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme can be attributed to the over relaxation of
the parameters crucial in determining the success of the scheme. Section 5
1

The submission can be viewed here:
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/greenpaper/consultation/pubs/0721-school-of-accounting-andfinance.pdf
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summarises Australian Government’s preferred position under the Green Paper
including design assessment criteria. Section 6 highlights key weakness areas of the
Scheme which could contribute to its failure. Lastly, section 7 concludes.

2. The Role of a Generic Emissions Trading Scheme: the Cap–n–Trade
Approach

For the most effective reduction in pollution output, all carbon emitters would be
required to reduce their emissions over time according to each signatory country’s
declared carbon reduction trajectories. 2 For an effective reduction in global emissions,
emitters would have to incur a financial penalty for emission at a price which is costly
enough to justify investment in comparatively cleaner technologies and/or methods
resulting in lower actual output of emissions.

In the cap-n-trade approach, all carbon emitters would be required to offset their
emissions by the use of trading permits either with or without the use of alternative
carbon offsets. These trading permits are expected to be distributed and/or auctioned
off to emitters and non-emitters alike at regular intervals provided that the units of
CO2-e covered in these permits do not exceed the trajectory set by the government.
The number of permits is therefore set to a “cap”. Each trading permit has definable
proprietary (both legal and equitable) rights to facilitate the transfer of these rights,
and is retired upon use to offset a specific amount of emissions 3 . Accordingly, a
secondary market in which the trading of carbon permits between market participants
takes place is expected to exist.
2

Australia has not made such declaration at the time of writing but is scheduled to do so at the end of
2008.
3
Currently set at 1 ton of CO2-e gasses.
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The use of this cap-n-trade approach as the basis of the generic ETS engenders
multiple objectives. The Green Paper, while unclear with the specifics of an
Australian ETS, nevertheless signals its intention to adopt the cap-n-trade approach
rather than a carbon tax.

The Government has stated that the development of the Scheme will be guided by the
following principles:
•

The scheme will be a 'cap and trade' scheme. That is, it will set an overall
environmental cap by issuing a set number of permits, and allow entities to
trade permits, thereby putting a price on carbon.

•

The caps will be designed to place Australia on a low emissions path in a way
that best manages the economic impacts of transition, while assuring our
ongoing economic prosperity.

•

The scheme will have maximal coverage of greenhouse gases and sectors, to
the extent that this is practical. The broader the scheme's coverage, the more
cost-effectively it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and more fairly
spread the burden of such reductions across the community.

•

The scheme will be designed to enable international linkages, while ensuring it
suits Australia's economic conditions.

•

The scheme design will address the competitive challenges facing emissionintensive trade-exposed industries in Australia.

•

The scheme will also address the impact on strongly-affected industries.

•

Measures will be developed to assist households - particularly low income
households - to adjust to the impact of carbon prices.

7

It is clear from the above principles that the Government is aware of the need to
achieve this country’s environmental objective with due consideration to financial
impact to the economy. Given that the Government is responsible for setting and
defining the key parameters of the framework in the Scheme, this juggling act is
ultimately determined by a political process which can be subjected to manipulative
pressures from other interests. Setting a cap that is too high for fear of financial
backlash jeopardises the environmental objective as less pressure is put upon emitters
to conform; while setting a cap that is too strict on emitters would substantially
increase the financial impact on the economy.

In highlighting what we argue are potential key deficiencies in the Scheme, for the
purpose of comparison, we rely on a rudimentary ETS framework which maximises
the environmental objective but disregards the financial impact it may cause.
Additionally, we examine the reasons why the EU ETS has failed to reduce overall
verified emissions during its first phase of operation as basis to illustrate how an
environmental conservation scheme can fail in this context.

3. The Naïve Model
As the starting point of our discussion, we introduce a strict ETS model which
maximises the environmental objective and which, by necessity, ignores its economic
impact. This ‘naïve’ model is then compared to the carbon pollution reduction
schemes in Europe and Australia to illustrate our argument that certain elements of
the Australian model may potentially be deficient in achieving the environmental
objective.
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We envisage this naïve model to utilise the cap-n-trade approach. In our model,
assuming that the emission limit for a specific year is 1,000 kilo tons of CO2-e gasses,
then a similar amount will be covered by carbon trading permits, which, if specified at
1 ton per permit, would equate to 1 million permits. Since no carbon offset is allowed,
an emitter who emits for example 10 kilo tons of CO2-e gasses per year will be
required by the regulatory framework to offset its emissions using 10,000 permits.
The shelf-life of each permit is limited to one year, and all emitters regardless of size
or industry are covered under this model. All permits are auctioned off in an
ascending manner with combined amount of CO2-e covered in the permits not
exceeding the trajectory declared for that year. The financial penalty for noncompliance is set so impossibly high that it ceases to be an issue.

With a declared set of emission reduction trajectory in place, and given no other
alternative mean of offsetting emissions beside the use of permits, the supply of
permits will decrease over time, thereby making scarcity of permits an important
consideration to emitters. Unless demand for these permits adjusts, the price of carbon
permits is expected to rise, ceteris paribus. With the same or increased in output
production, emitters who do not consider cleaner ways of achieving this level of
output and/or invest in research & development in cleaner production methodology
will bear the brunt of the costs of emission. Eventually, the cost of acquiring carbon
permits will outgrow the cost of reducing actual emissions in this model, in which
case emitters would have no other choice but to start exploring cleaner ways of
production, or to reduce production, or shut down completely in the extreme when
business is not viable given the costs. In any of these scenarios, the environmental
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objective is maximised at all cost. Any impact on the economy or industry
competitiveness is considered.

As can be seen, while the naïve model demonstrates how the environmental objective
is the one and only focus, its lack of consideration of economic and business impact
renders it an impractical one to implement. Accordingly, it is to be expected that any
cap-n-trade scheme would be in practice a more relaxed model with better treatment
of economic and financial costs. However, as next section shows in Europe, the overrelaxation of the model, as seen in the lenient setting of key parameters in the EU
scheme, for the purpose of protecting businesses has rendered the EU scheme
ineffective in combating emissions output.

4. Relaxations of the Naïve Model: Lessons from EU ETS
No rational government would pursue a strict model such as the one described above.
The political process is subjected to pressure from various sources, particularly from
the collective influence of businesses whose interests will not be ignored by
governments.

Evidence from the EU ETS suggests that companies implement typical project
selection exercise in determining the cheapest method to offset emissions. That is to
say, although compliance with the scheme is required by law, emitters would seek the
most cost-effective way to do so as profitability is arguably a more important factor
than environmental care. Indeed, the European Commission reported on 23rd May
2008 that during the first phase of the EU ETS (2005 – 2007), the 24 EU member
states (not including Romania, Bulgaria and Malta) have achieved a change in
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verified emissions ranging -20.8% to 28.5%, with an overall increase in emissions by
1.9% in that period. As can be seen from Table 1, results in emission change range
widely with Sweden achieving the best result. Finland and Estonia are the worst
culprits with both increasing emissions by over 20% respectively in that period.
Clearly, this outcome undermines the intention of their scheme and thus the EU ETS
has been described as a failure.
Table 1: Verified Emissions from European Union Members, 2005 – 2007.
This table illustrates the verified emissions of 24 European Union members during the first phase of
operation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Figures are in metric tonnes
of CO2.

Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Estonia
Spain
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Sweden
Slovenia
SK
UK

2005
33,372,826
55,363,223
5,078,877
82,454,618
474,990,760
26,475,718
12,621,817
183,626,981
33,099,625
131,263,787
71,267,736
26,161,627
22,441,000
225,989,357
6,603,869
2,603,349
2,854,481
80,351,288
203,149,562
36,425,915
19,381,623
8,720,548
25,231,767
242,513,099

Verified Emissions
2006
32,382,804
54,775,314
5,259,273
83,624,953
478,016,581
34,199,588
12,109,278
179,711,225
44,621,411
126,979,048
69,965,145
25,845,891
21,705,328
227,439,408
6,516,911
2,712,972
2,940,680
76,701,184
209,616,285
33,083,871
19,884,147
8,842,181
25,543,239
251,159,840

2007
31,751,165
52,795,318
5,396,164
87,834,758
487,004,055
29,407,355
15,329,931
186,495,894
42,541,327
126,634,806
72,717,006
26,835,478
21,246,117
226,368,773
5,998,744
2,567,231
2,849,203
79,874,658
209,601,993
31,183,076
15,348,209
9,048,633
24,516,830
256,581,160

Total

2,012,043,453

2,033,636,557

2,049,927,884

Change
2005-2007
-4.90%
-4.60%
6.20%
6.50%
2.50%
11.10%
21.50%
1.60%
28.50%
-3.50%
2.00%
2.60%
-5.30%
0.20%
-9.20%
-1.40%
-0.20%
-0.60%
3.20%
-14.40%
-20.80%
3.80%
-2.80%
5.80%
1.90%

Source: European Commission press release 23rd May 2008 4 .
4

“Emissions trading: 2007 verified emissions from EU ETS businesses”, viewed 25th July 2008,
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/787&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en#fn1>
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The first phase of the EU ETS covered approximately 12,000 installations
representing some 40% of EU CO2 emissions. Under the EU scheme, the EU member
states agree on national emission caps which have to be approved by the European
Commission, allocate free allowances to their industrial operators under each
member’s National Allocation Plan, track and validate the actual emissions against
the emission caps, and require the allowances to be retired after the end of each year.

There are three lessons from this failure:
(1) Lax emission reduction targets culminated in unambitious emission caps. This
suggests a tentative commitment, at best, by EU member countries. With some
countries achieving a growth in emissions of over 20%, the caps set by most
EU member states are simply not ambitious enough. Indeed, caps set for the
power sector are far too lenient compared to other sectors, resulting in
inequitable carbon reduction requirements.
(2) The over allocation (as compared to business-as-usual emissions level) of free
carbon trading permits provided no incentive for businesses to reduce
emissions. The over allocation of permits occurred in 20 out of the 24
reporting EU member countries. EU member states have given away under
their respective National Allocation Plans far too many free allowances to
their installations, particularly to the power sector which is a major source of
pollution. Moreover, as Ecofys reported in August 2004 5 , several countries
have given more allowances than estimated to be needed under business-asusual scenario. This implies that no practical effort is necessary to reduce
emissions in these countries since current level of emissions is more than
5

Ecofys Interim Report on National Allocation Plans, August 2004, viewed 15th August 2008,
<http://www.ecofys.co.uk/com/publications/gate.asp?fn=documents/Interim_Report_NAP_Evaluation
_180804.pdf>
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enough covered by carbon permits. This was confirmed in May 2006 when
several carbon registries reported that their industries were given more
allowances than they could possibly use. The price of carbon emission
spiralled immediately after, reaching an all time low of €0.03 per ton in
December 2007. 6 With permits trading at super cheap prices, and no issue
whatsoever with scarcity in terms of the availability of allowances and carbon
permits, it is not surprising to find that the EU ETS has failed so remarkably.
(3) The EU ETS allocated free carbon permits to business installations (entities)
which were significant polluters and thus further undermining the purported
intentions of their scheme.

While the EU carbon market is overseen by a neutral regulator, the setting of the
emissions cap and the National Allocation Plan are specific to each government of the
member states. The failure of the EU scheme due to above factors strongly suggests
that these governments have been materially influenced by economic and business
concerns. Indeed, European businesses have manipulated the scheme by passing on
costs to consumers even though the permits were allocated to them with zero
consideration. The International Herald Tribune observed: “the carbon trading system
has created a multibillion-euro windfall for some of the continent's biggest polluters,
with little or no noticeable benefit to the environment so far.” 7

If governments are reluctant to boldly confront the environmental issue and thus
directly and/or indirectly undermine the mechanics of an effective carbon scheme as a
result, we argue that there is no point having an EU ETS in the first place.
6

Prices obtained from the European Energy Exchange, < http://www.eex.com/en>
Kanter, J., 9th December 2008, “EU carbon trading system brings windfalls for some, with little
benefit to climate”, viewed 12th December 2008
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/09/business/windfall.php>
7
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Compliance to any form of scheme requires costs, and in this case there is no
justifying additional financial cost investment without any real credible collective
effort in achieving the objectives of the scheme. A poorly constructed scheme not
only fails in meeting the environmental objective but also create an inequitable timesink forced upon businesses and households
5. Australia’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme at a Glance
The CPRS Green Paper, published by the Department of Climate Change, puts
forward the Australian Government’s preferred positions on the Carbon Pollution
Reduction Scheme. It is stated that the overall framework of the CPRS is to achieve
the environmental objective in the most efficient and cost effective way. 8 Emissions
trading is the mechanism of the Scheme, and the framework and design options of the
Scheme are to be assessed according to the following assessment criteria (Green
Paper Preferred Positions, pg. 35):

1. Environmental integrity
2. Economic efficiency
3. Minimisation of implementation risk
4. Policy flexibility
5. Promotion of international objectives
6. Implications for industry competitiveness
7. Accountability and transparency
8. Fairness

8

The meaning of efficiency and cost-effectiveness can be subjectively interpreted. In regards to the
latter, it is interesting to note that this is a departure from the Garnaut Report which used the phrase
“…to deliver emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost to the domestic economy” (Garnaut
Report, pg. 321)
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The major key elements are summarised as follows:


The Scheme to start in 2010. All six Kyoto gases to be included.



Current coverage is about 1000 operators comprising approximately 70% of
current Australian emissions. Petrol is included. Possible inclusion of
agriculture in 2015.



Obligation to surrender permits sets at an emission threshold for facilities of
25kt of CO2-e per annum.



Annual emissions cap to be set on a rolling five year basis.



A range of assistance mechanisms will be granted to industries most affected
by the Scheme (known as Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries, or
EITEs):
o Activities with emissions intensity above 2kt CO2-e per dollar million
revenue will at first be granted free permits that cover approximately
90% per unit of output. Free permits granted will decrease to 60% for
activities with emissions intensity of 1.5kt CO2-e per dollar million
revenue. The total amount of free permits given will use approximately
30% of total available number of permits.



Special assistance is also given to Strongly-Affected Industries (SAIs) which
include coal fired electricity generators. Size of fund to be determined in
White Paper.



A Climate Change Action Fund will be established to fund investment in, inter
alia, lower carbon technology and to raise awareness for businesses.



Australian carbon permits will be auctioned off on a quarterly basis by a
regulator.
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The rights under the permits are fully described and are fully transferrable.
Equitable interests can be registered against these rights.



Legal transfer of the permits possible only via a registry.



As these permits will have no use-by date, the unlimited banking of these
permits will therefore be permitted. An entity may borrow up to 5% of
emissions units from future years’ caps.



A cap on permit price for the period 2010 – 2015 to be set higher than the
expected market level.



Design of the Scheme to be compatible with international schemes thereby
making market linkages a future possibility.



Accounting guidance to be determined by national and international standard
setters.

In regard to the governance of the Scheme, the Government/Parliament sets the key
rules such as caps and reduction targets, international links, permit allocation rules
etc. A Scheme regulator will be established to make independent decisions based on
rules set in legislation.

As expected, the Green Paper addresses (though not fully) both environmental and
economic objectives. The Government is now opened for submissions 9 for future
consideration in the development of the Scheme.

As discussed before, the lessons from the EU ETS have proven important in
suggesting that the setting of the trajectories and caps and the assistance given in the

9

Submission to the Green Paper is now closed.
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form of allowance to industrial operators are both crucial factors in determining the
success or failure of the Scheme. Australia’s position in this regard is not fully known.
Indeed it is interesting to note the Government’s willingness to grant assistance
without properly addressing how the assistance arrangement can help affected
industries reduce their emissions rather than passing on the costs to consumers.
Perhaps more importantly, the development of the Green Paper itself suggests a
political process that is more concerned with business interests since these are
addressed more explicitly than Australia’s proposed trajectories and caps.

6. Key Weakness Areas of Australia’s Scheme
As the experience from Europe has shown, good intentions toward environmental
conservation do not necessarily produce the requisite result. Indeed, as the Garnaut
Report (pg. 321) observes, “seemingly small compromises will quickly erode the
benefits that a well designed emissions trading scheme can provide”.

We detail in this section five areas which we argue are potential shortfalls in
Australia’s Scheme. While these areas can be individually identified, the respective
areas are inherently intertwined.

6.1 Government as policy setter
The crux of this area of weakness is the age-old question of “who governs the
government”. The determination of crucial parameters in the Scheme is to be made by
a political process which can be materially influenced by lobby groups pursuing their
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respective interests or by submissions made by individuals and organisations 10 .
Indeed, the Garnaut Report warned against such influence when it observed (on pg.
343):

“In recent public debate and commentary, it has been apparent that industries
will seek to influence the design of any such assistance arrangements in ways
that maximise their respective returns from the scheme. This is to be expected.
It also signals the scale of the challenge faced by policy makers in not
becoming distracted by vocal and well organised interests.”

It is important to observe that the Scheme Regulator, while tasked with making
independent decisions, does so based on rules already set in legislation. Additionally,
as the Green Paper itself suggests, independent recommendations made by the
Garnaut Review are not always readily adopted by the Government. 11

The setting of critical elements such as the short and long term emissions reduction
trajectories and the allocation of free permits, inter alia, directly defines the strictness
of the Scheme, and thereby signals the Government’s intentions in regards to the
environmental objective, as our naïve model illustrates earlier. While it is not for this
study to put forward an opinion on this matter, it is interesting to note nevertheless
that the Government has appeared to have taken a modest stance on emissions

10

A list of submissions made to the Green Paper can be viewed online here:
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/greenpaper/consultation/submissions.html
11
Various visible “discrepancies” exist. For example, Garnaut Report recommends that no permit is to
be freely allocated whereas the Government has signalled its intentions to do so to protect certain
emissions-intensive industries.
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reduction targets. 12 This is in spite of recent Government’s plan to expand coal
exports in Newcastle. 13

6.2 Links with international schemes
Linkage with international carbon markets is recommended by the Garnaut Report
and is also provided for in the Green Paper. The Government has indicated that it is
carefully calibrating its response in light of international action, and has made the
minimisation of implementation risk an early priority for the sake of establishing a
stable/predictable start up. However, this vision is not adequately substantiated by
more detailed definition of key elements. This creates an added layer of uncertainty to
businesses as Scheme obligations and other variables may change with the
introduction of international links.

6.3 Uncertainty on how certain industries are to be protected.
Emissions intensive industries will be significantly affected by the introduction of the
Scheme. If no assistance is rendered, these industries would face immediate
deterioration in profitability, market-share and therefore competitiveness in the
international setting. With no effective short-term response to the Scheme 14 , these
industries may be forced to relocate their emissions intensive operations away from

12

See for example: Wilkinson, M. , 1st December 2008, “Australia squibs on climate promise”, Sydney
Morning Herald < http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/climate-promiseuturn/2008/11/30/1227979844927.html>and Wilkinson, M. and Cubby, B., 10th December 2008,
“Wong to resist calls for greenhouse cuts”, Sydney Morning Herald. <
http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/global-warming/wong-to-resist-calls-for-greenhousecuts/2008/12/09/1228584839266.html>
13
Sydney Morning Herald, 14th December 2008, “Large targets needed in ETS: Greenpeace”. <
http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/global-warming/large-targets-needed-in-etsgreenpeace/2008/12/14/1229189428795.html>
14
In the steel industry for example, emissions are inherently unavoidable given the chemical processes
that are involved in the production of steel.
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Australia, thus costing jobs to Australia and not creating an impact on reduction of
global emissions.

The Green Paper acknowledges that emissions intensive industries, such as the EITEs
and SAIs, should be provided with transitional assistance. For the former, up to 30%
of total number of permits will be freely allocated. A special fund (not fully defined)
will be established to assist SAIs. However, crucial questions remain to be answered.
The Government admits the need to balance support for EITE firms with other
community interests by adjusting EITE assistance over time to ensure equitable
contribution. It is also stated however that withdrawal of assistance “depends on
international developments”, with “thresholds and rates of assistance to be finalised in
light of additional information”. 15

6.4 The issue of scarcity of carbon permits
The naïve model shows that scarcity is introduced when the number of permits is
effectively capped if permits have limited shelf-life and are all surrendered at the end
of the compliance period. Under the proposed Scheme, while the number of permits
available per year will be capped according to the reduction trajectory, permits will
however have an indefinite life, are bankable for future use, and limited number of
permits from future years (called ‘vintage’) can be borrowed for current use.
Additionally, a carbon bank will be established and empowered to lend limited
number of permits. These characteristics arguably convolute the issue of scarcity in
actual practice. It is important to note that scarcity forms the first guiding principle of
scheme design according to the Ganaut Report, which asserts (at pg. 323) that

15

Green Paper Roadshow Presentation, pg. 25 & 29.
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“…where the scarcity of permits is uncertain…this will distort resource allocation
decisions and impose unnecessarily high costs on the economy”.

6.5 Timing of implementation
The Australian Opposition asserts that the Scheme is too rushed and is in need of
more extensive consultation with stakeholders. 16 It can also be argued that
implementation of the Scheme should be delayed so that international action on
climate change can be more readily discerned. Moreover, given the recent credit crisis
which has affected the world’s economy, and which has lead to depressed business
and consumer confidence as well as recessions in several developed countries, the
commencement of the Scheme in 2010 will impose unwelcome costs on a recovering
Australian economy.

7. Conclusions
The release of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme reinforces Australia’s
commitment to emissions reduction and environmental protection.

This paper

highlights the crucial and inverse relationship between achieving effective carbon
pollution reduction with minimal costs to businesses and the community, the
balancing act which is determined by a political process. In doing so, we showed a
model which maximises the environmental objective (the naïve model) and illustrates
the failures of the scheme in the European Union where the scheme has been
extensively relaxed compared to our naïve model for fear of economic backlash. We
argue that, once committed, the Scheme has to work as a whole in reducing carbon
emissions for it to justify the compliance and other associated costs on the economy.
16

Joint press conference with Malcolm Turnbull, Leader of the Opposition, and Andrew Robb, shadow
minister assisting the Leader on Emissions Trading Design.
<http://www.liberal.org.au/news.php?Id=2302> Accessed 12th December 2008.
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There are several key areas in the Scheme which we highlighted as potential shortfalls
which can contribute to the failure of the Scheme. We also show that the Australian
Government, in its development of the CPRS, has shown more concern toward nonenvironmental interests by being more upfront with the assistance available to
affected industries, and less transparent in regards to setting the carbon reduction
trajectories and the cap which are both crucial in determining the success or failure of
the Scheme.
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